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ABSTRACT. The Time Tradeoff (TTO) method is a popular method for valuing health 
state utilities and is frequently used in economic evaluations. However, this method 
produces utilities that are distorted by several biases. One important bias entails the 
failure to incorporate time discounting. This paper aims to measure time discounting 
for health outcomes in a sample representative for the general population. In 
particular, we estimate TTO scores alongside time discounting in order to derive a set 
of correction factors that can be employed to correct raw TTO scores for the 
downward bias caused by time discounting. We find substantial positive correction 
factors, which are increasing with the severity of the health state. Furthermore, higher 
discounting is found when using more severe health states in the discounting 
elicitation task. More research is needed to further develop discount rate elicitation 
procedures and test their validity, especially in general public samples. Moreover, 
future research should investigate the correction of TTO score for other biases as well, 
such as loss aversion, and to develop a criterion to test the external validity of TTO 
scores. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Economic evaluations of health technologies often and ideally express outcomes in 
terms of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs). In order to find appropriate QALY 
weights for different health states ― a crucial matter obviously in coming to accurate 
estimates of cost-utility ratios ― often the time trade-off (TTO) method is used to 
elicit preferences for health states (e.g., Dolan, 2000). This can be either done within 
the context of one particular economic evaluation, or more systematically in order to 
derive national quality of life ‘tariffs’, such as those corresponding to the frequently 
used EuroQol-5D descriptive system (Dolan et al., 1996). The latter strategy was also 
adopted in the Netherlands, where a national Dutch tariff exists, which is based on the 
TTO method (Lamers et al., 2006). The accuracy of this national tariff therefore 
depends to a large extent on the accuracy of the TTO method to correctly elicit 
preferences for health states. The same holds for many other national tariffs.  
In a TTO, individuals need to make a tradeoff between quality of life and 
duration of life. A typical TTO exercise involves a tradeoff between living in some 
imperfect health state β for 10 years and living in full health for a period less than 10 
(say X) years. The amount of time people are willing to sacrifice in order to regain 
full health then indicates the value of the health state under consideration and can 
subsequently be used to calculate the QALY weight of that health state. Normally, 
using the linear QALY model as a theoretical underpinning, this is done by simply 
dividing X by 10. The linear QALY model underlying this calculation assumes that 
individuals attach an equal weight to each future year. Under that assumption, the 
amount of time people are willing to sacrifice in order to regain full health 
immediately indicates the value of the health state β and can subsequently be used to 
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calculate its QALY weight (which equals X/10). If a person for instance is indifferent 
between 7 years in full health and 10 years in health state β, then β is assumed to have 
a utility value of 0.7. 
However, it is well-known by now that the traditional TTO method and the 
linear QALY model are not without methodological problems, which can lead to 
systematic bias in resulting health state valuations (and through that in cost-utility 
analysis using the outcomes). Using TTO responses in the way described above 
requires strong assumptions, of which linear utility of life duration is an important one 
(Bleichrodt, 2002). Linear utility of life duration simply refers to the fact that the 
conventional (linear) QALY model assumes that each added life year in a certain 
health condition is of equal value regardless of its timing and to what health stock it is 
added. This assumption is, however, hard to maintain. People weight future years 
differently (normally lower) than present ones, importantly due to discounting (while 
diminishing marginal utility may also play a role). This implies that the utility 
increase from having the projected tenth year in the TTO is lower than that from the 
first year. Discounting is problematic in the context of using the responses from a 
TTO, as the common calculation method does not take into account utility curvature, 
leading to a downward bias in QALY weights (Bleichrodt, 2002). 
Consequently, the QALY-scores elicited by the conventional TTO procedure, 
also those used in national tariffs, are biased. The influence of this bias (which we will 
label simply as discounting from this point onwards) can be substantial. A typical 
respondent having to trade-off future life years in order to regain full health is likely 
to discount future life years (Stiggelbout et al., 1994; Stalmeier et al., 1996; Wakker 
and Deneffe, 1996; Martin et al., 2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2005; van der Pol and 
Roux, 2005; Abellán-Perpinán et al., 2006; Attema et al., forthcoming b). Simply 
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using the number of future life years that individuals are willing to trade-off in 
calculating QALY weights, thus leads to a misrepresentation of the utility attached to 
a current imperfect health state, which can have a substantial impact, also on cost-
effectiveness outcomes (Attema and Brouwer, 2010). Yet, most current valuations and 
national tariffs (including the Dutch tariff) are based on this method. 
In order to have a better estimate of the true QALY weight of a health state, a 
correction for utility curvature is required (Attema and Brouwer, 2009). This is 
especially true for discounting given the way that resulting health state valuations are 
normally used in economic evaluations, i.e., they are discounted to calculate a net 
present value of QALYs (e.g., Gravelle et al., 2007). If uncorrected TTO scores are 
used to calculate QALYs and these are subsequently discounted using some discount 
rate for health effects, this would amount to double discounting and an 
underestimation of the utility derived from some health state (MacKeigan et al., 
2003). 
A number of alternatives exists to measure (and correct TTO scores for) 
discounting of future life years. These include the Certainty Equivalence (CE) method 
for a risky setting (Miyamoto and Eraker, 1985), and, for riskless settings, the 
parametric ‘delay of ill health’ (DOI) method (Cairns, 1992) and the nonparametric 
Direct Method (DM) (Attema et al., forthcoming b). However, the elicitation of 
discounting can be a burdensome task, obviating the need for a toolkit that can be 
easier implemented. This study has as its first aim to develop such a toolkit by 
presenting a first attempt for a general correction set for national tariffs that can be 
used to correct ‘ordinary’ TTO tariffs for discounting.  
It is important to recognize that different biases in the TTO methods work in 
different directions and, hence, may cancel each other out (Bleichrodt, 2002). In 
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theory, a correction for one of these biases may then deteriorate the accuracy of TTO 
tariffs in describing health preferences. A second aim of this study is therefore to 
investigate whether a correction for discounting improves the predictive validity in a 
ranking task of health profiles that are composed of periods in bad health and full 
health. To this end, we elicit discounting of future life years in a large representative 
sample of the Dutch population. We estimate discounting by means of two different 
methods and explore their impact on TTO scores for health states of different degrees 
of severity. Moreover, we assess the validity of the corrected TTO scores compared to 
each other and to uncorrected TTO scores, Standard Gamble (SG) scores and Visual 
Analogue Scale (VAS) scores by employing a ‘ranking of health profiles’ task 
(Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 1997). 
The organization of this paper is as follows. We describe the methodological 
background in Section 2, followed by the design of the experiment in Section 3. The 
results are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 presents the discussion. 
 
2. Method 
 
The general QALY model evaluates chronic health profiles (Q,T) by the function 
U(Q,T)=V(Q)W(T), with U(Q,T) the total utility of a period T in the chronic health 
state Q, V(Q) the QALY weight of Q, W(T) the discounted utility of duration T. 
Assuming this model, the QALY weight V(Q) can be estimated by several methods. 
Because all methods are prone to different biases, it is not a priori clear which method 
is best to use to elicit QALY weights. As indicated by Bleichrodt (2002), each bias is 
expected to work in a particular direction, causing either an overall upward bias (SG) 
or an ambiguous bias (TTO). This study measures the size of the bias in TTO caused 
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by discounting. Moreover, we test the predictive validity of the SG, TTO, and VAS 
by using an intertemporal ranking task, and, in particular, investigate whether 
correcting TTO scores for discounting increases or decreases TTO’s predictive 
validity. The applied methods are described below. 
 
2.1. Time tradeoff method 
 
The TTO method elicits preferences for health states by letting a subject imagine 
living T more years in an imperfect health state. The subject then has to indicate the 
number remaining life time x<T in full health such that he is indifferent between 
living T years in the imperfect health state and living x years in full health. According 
to the QALY model, the resulting indifference can be evaluated by: 
 
V(Q)W(T) = V(FH)W(x). (1) 
 
Normalizing V(Q) such that V(FH)=1, leaves us with: 
 
V(Q) = W(x)/W(T). (2) 
 
Investigators using TTO often assume the linear QALY model, i.e., W(t)=t/T, which 
implies a simplification of Eq. 2 to: 
 
V(Q) = x/T. (3) 
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However, since the aforementioned empirical literature suggests this assumption is 
not valid, we do not make it and first measure the shape of W(T). Furthermore, we 
estimate a set of correction factors (CFs, such that V(Q)=x/T+CF) to directly correct 
TTO scores for discounting (Attema and Brouwer, 2010). The CFs are regressed on 
several explanatory variables, including gender, age, health status, and time horizon, 
so that different CFs can be applied depending on the specifics of the situation. 
 In addition to discounting, TTO is subject to distortions caused by loss 
aversion and scale compatibility (Bleichrodt, 2002). Loss aversion occurs if 
individuals adopt a reference point and consider outcomes as deviations from this 
reference point. Higher outcomes are seen as gains, and lower outcomes as losses, 
with losses looming larger than gains, and, hence, receiving more weight than 
commensurate gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; McNeil et al., 1982; Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Stalmeier and Bezembinder, 
1999; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2002). The effect of loss aversion on TTO scores depends 
on the elicitation procedure. The most common procedure is to fix the duration in 
imperfect health and ask for the number of years in full health that makes the 
respondent indifferent. In this case, loss aversion will cause an upward bias in TTO 
scores. If instead the duration in full health is fixed and the duration in imperfect 
health that is considered equivalent is asked for, a downward bias results (Bleichrodt, 
2002). 
Scale compatibility means that an individual assigns more weight to an 
attribute the higher its compatibility with the response scale used (Bleichrodt and 
Pinto, 2002; Bleichrodt, 2002). The response scale in TTO is life duration, so scale 
compatibility predicts the respondent to give more weight to life duration than to 
health status. As a consequence, the TTO scores will be inflated (Bleichrodt, 2002). 
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2.2. Standard gamble method 
 
The SG method typically asks a subject to imagine being in an imperfect health state 
and to consider two alternatives. One is a risky treatment with a probability p that the 
subject returns to full health and will live for T additional years, and a complementary 
probability 1-p of immediate death. The other alternative involves the certainty that 
the current health state will persist for the rest of his life (T years again). The 
probability p is then varied until the subject is indifferent between these alternatives. 
Using the QALY model under expected utility and normalization, we get V(Q)W(T) = 
pW(T), so V(Q) = p and p represents the utility of the considered imperfect health 
state. 
 Two major biases distort SG utilities. These biases are consequences of EU 
often being descriptively falsified (Llewellyn-Thomas et al., 1982; Rutten-van 
Molken et al., 1995). First, people tend to attach nonlinear decision weights to 
probabilities instead of handling them linearly (Wakker and Stiggelbout, 1995; 
Bleichrodt et al., 1999; Stalmeier and Bezembinder, 1999; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 
2000; Bleichrodt, 2001). Second, loss aversion causes individuals to have a reference 
point (e.g., the certain option) and may consider the worst outcome of the gamble a 
loss, which they give more weight. Both biases are predicted to produce an upward 
bias on SG utilities (Bleichrodt, 2002). 
 
2.3. Visual analogue scale 
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A third way to elicit V(Q) is by means of the VAS. Such a rating scale simply asks a 
respondent to put the health state to be valued on a thermometer, mostly scaled 
between 0 (worst imaginable health state) and 100 (best imaginable health state). The 
VAS does not involve any duration. Furthermore, the VAS is often seen as a 
choiceless method with no clear theoretical foundation (Dolan, 2000), although its use 
has been defended (Parkin and Devlin, 2006). The estimate of V(Q) is directly given 
by the number provided by the respondent (or a transformation of it, see S.3.4.1). 
 
2.4. Intertemporal ranking task 
 
Given the fact that the aforementioned distorting factors work in different directions, 
they may (partly) cancel each other out. Therefore, correcting for one of them need 
not necessarily improve the predictive validity of the resulting QALY weights. 
Therefore, we incorporated an intertemporal ranking task in order to test whether 
correcting TTO scores for discounting would increase the predictive accuracy of 
choices among health profiles. 
This task was proposed by Bleichrodt and Johannesson (1997) as a means to 
compare the ability of utilities elicited by different methods (e.g., SG, TTO, or VAS) 
to predict people’s choices among different health profiles.2 It enables a comparison 
of the revealed ranking and the predicted ranking according to the elicited health state 
values. In case of substantial differences between results obtained with different 
methods, the test might detect whether one method predicts revealed rankings better 
than others. A reduction in predictive accuracy after correcting for discounting would 
suggest other factors being at work as well, with influences in the opposite directions. 
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As long as correction mechanisms for the other biases are lacking, it would, then, not 
be worthwhile to correct TTO scores for discounting (at least not for the health state 
and time horizon under consideration). If, on the other hand, a correction for 
discounting would increase the predictive ability, it suggests that the absolute 
influence of discounting is higher than that of the other biases and, hence, it becomes 
worthwhile to correct for discounting (according to this standard, at least). Finally, our 
intertemporal ranking task allowed a replication of the test performed by Bleichrodt 
and Johannesson (1997), i.e., providing a standard against which to judge the 
performance of SG, TTO, and VAS. 
 
3. Experiment 
 
3.1. Subjects 
 
A total of 520 subjects (version A: 262; version B: 258) representative for the Dutch 
general population participated in the experiment. 
 
3.2. Procedure 
 
The experiment was conducted by a professional internet sampling company (Survey 
Sampling International). This company has much experience with internet surveys 
and a large representative database of subjects. The subjects were rewarded with a 
monetary amount to be given to a charity fund of their choice. 
                                                                                                                                       
2
 The task has also been applied in follow-up studies (Abellán-Perpinán et al., 2009; Attema et al., 
forthcoming a). 
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 The experiment started with some questions regarding background 
characteristics. After that, the subjects had to answer the ranking and VAS tasks. 
These tasks were asked at the beginning in order to let subjects familiarize with the 
valuation tasks. The survey continued with a random draw of either the SG or the 
TTO task. Finally, discounting was elicited by means of the DM, and the experiment 
ended with the DOI task. 
Indifferences were elicited by using sequences of binary choices, because 
indifference by choice tends to cause fewer inconsistencies than indifference by 
matching (Bostic et al., 1990; Hey et al., 2009; Attema and Brouwer, 2012b). We 
used a bisection procedure that adjusted the value of X upwards or downwards 
depending on the chosen option. The size of the change was always half the size of 
the change in the previous question. We randomized the labeling of the options as “A” 
(left) or “B” (right). 
 
3.2.1. Discounting 
 
Because of time constraints, we could only use two discounting methods. We chose to 
use the DOI method and the DM for this purpose. The CE method was not used 
because it heavily relies on the validity of EU, which has been shown to be 
descriptively flawed (Starmer, 2000; Bleichrodt et al., 2007) and because it uses a 
risky context, unlike the TTO method. Finally, Attema et al. (forthcoming a) found no 
difference between utility elicited with the DM and utility elicited with the CE after 
correcting for probability weighting in the CE. 
The DOI method aims to elicit intertemporal preferences for non-fatal changes 
in health. It identifies an indifferent point between two durations of ill-health which 
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occur at two different points in time. This is accomplished by one or more open-ended 
questions that ask the subject to imagine being ill at some point in the future and 
offers an opportunity for this spell of ill-health to be delayed due to a one-off 
treatment. The subject then has to identify a maximum number of days of future ill-
health at which it would still be worthwhile to receive this treatment (van der Pol and 
Cairns, 2001; van der Pol and Cairns, 2008)3. Subsequently, one has to specify a 
parametric discounting function (e.g., the constant discounting function or some kind 
of hyperbolic function) and estimate its parameter(s) that best fit the subject’s 
answer(s). This method has often been used to measure discounting future health 
benefits (Chapman and Elstein, 1995; Chapman, 1996; van der Pol and Cairns, 2002; 
van der Pol and Roux, 2005; van der Pol and Cairns, 2008). 
 The DM lets a subject compare two simple health profiles with horizon T, 
which are both combinations of two health states, e.g., γ and β, with γf β. The 
difference between the profiles is that one starts with the better health state γ and ends 
with the worse state β: (γ1,…,γt,βt+1,…,βT); whereas the other starts with β, followed 
by an improvement toward γ: (β1,…,βt,γt+1,…,γT). Now, the purpose is to elicit the 
point t=d1/2 such that an individual is indifferent between the two profiles, i.e., 
(γ1,…,γt,βt+1,…,βT) ~ (β1,…,βt,γt+1,…,γT). The period [0,d1/2] then has the same utility 
as [d1/2,T]: 
 
W(d1/2)V(γ) + W[d1/2,T]V(β) = W(d1/2)V(β) + W[d1/2,T]V(γ). (4) 
 
If we denote the health improvement from β to γ as X=V(γ)−V(β), we get: 
 
                                               
3
 Of course, the indifference point can also be estimated by making use of multiple closed-ended 
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W(T)V(β) + W(d1/2)X = W(T)V(β) + W[d1/2,T]X. (5) 
 
After simplification, we obtain: 
 
W(d1/2) = W[d1/2,T] (6) 
 
And because W(d1/2)+W[d1/2,T]=W(T)=1, we have: 
 
W(d1/2) = 1/2 (7) 
 
Hence, we need not know the quality of life weights of the health states involved. 
After sufficient elicitations, this method allows for a measurement of the complete 
utility function for life duration. For example, we can next find d1/4 such that 
W[0,d1/4]=W[d1/4,d1/2] and, hence, W(d1/4)=1/4, etc. If an individual would not 
discount the future, his value of d1/2 would be d1/2=1/2T and, accordingly, his utility 
function would be linear. 
 The situation changes if the utility of a health state and the utility of life 
duration are not mutually independent. The utility of life duration may for example be 
different for different health states. Therefore, we used three health states of differing 
severity in DM task. The DM has been applied in Attema and Brouwer (2008, 2009, 
2010). 
 
3.2.1. Visual analogue scale 
 
                                                                                                                                       
questions, for example in a discrete choice experiment (van der Pol and Cairns, 2008). 
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We started the experiment with a VAS with endpoints “worst imaginable health state” 
and “best imaginable health state” to familiarize subjects with the tasks. First, they 
were asked to rate their own health state on this scale, followed by three EQ-5D states 
(see S.3.3), as well as full health and death. 
 
3.2.2. Standard gamble and time tradeoff methods 
 
The indifference sequence was specified as follows. We always started the sequence 
with two sorting questions, which aimed to establish whether the subject preferred 
living T years in FH to T years in the impaired health state, and if so, whether it was 
valued better than dead (BTD) or worse than dead (WTD). To this end, if a subject 
indicated a preference for immediate death over the certain option in an impaired 
health state, a WTD procedure was started (Torrance, 1986). That is, the subject then 
had to evaluate the options “immediate death” and “% chance of full health and % 
chance of impaired health state” (SG), and the options “immediate death” and “X 
years in full health and 10-X years in an impaired health state” (TTO). Each sequence 
comprised five iterations.  
 
3.3. Stimuli 
 
We classified health states according to the EQ-5D system. This system classifies 
health states using five dimensions (mobility, self-care, usual activities, 
pain/discomfort and anxiety/depression), each consisting of three levels, with level 1 
meaning no problems on a dimension and level 3 meaning severe problems). We 
valued the following five EQ-5D health states: 21111, 22222, 32211, 32313 and 
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333334. These were all included in the study by Lamers et al. (2006), from which 
national EQ-5D tariffs were derived, allowing for a direct comparison with the tariffs. 
A time frame of T=120 months (10 years) was chosen in the SG and TTO tasks, 
which facilitates comparability across tasks. The DOI and DM tasks both had a time 
frame of T=240 months (20 years)5. 
In order to reduce response burden, we divided our sample into two 
subsamples. Both subsamples received all elicitation tasks (i.e., ranking of health 
states, ranking of health profiles, SG, TTO, VAS and discounting), but they had to 
value only three health states each (A: 21111, 32211, 33333; B: 22222, 32313, 
33333). Therefore, it was still possible to perform a within-subjects comparison of the 
utilities resulting from the different methods, and to individually correct TTO scores 
for discounting.  
The DOI method was employed using two different EQ-5D health states, i.e., 
state 21111 for sample A and state 22222 for sample B. The subjects had to imagine 
becoming ill (i.e., move from full health to 21111 or 22222) during 30 days after 
exactly 5 years from now. However, they could take a one-off treatment that would 
delay the illness by more 5 years, so that it would start 10 years from now. They were 
then asked whether they preferred treatment, no treatment, or whether they were 
indifferent. If they were not indifferent, they were asked to state the number of days 
that did make them indifferent (which had to be a number of at least 30 if they 
preferred the treatment at first, and no more than 30 if they preferred no treatment at 
first). 
                                               
4
 For example, state 32211 stands for: Confined to bed, some problems washing or dressing oneself, 
some problems with performing one’s usual activities, no pain or other discomfort, not anxious or 
depressed. 
5
 This time frame had to be at least 10 years to capture all discounting affecting the TTO task. 
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The DM also used EQ-5D health states 21111 and 22222 for samples A and B, 
respectively, but it also included state 33333 in both samples. We deliberately used 
states that were also included in the health state valuation task, in order to prevent a 
distortion in the correction of health state utilities for discounting that would arise if 
subjects would differentially discount different health states. Attema and Brouwer 
(2012a) reported empirical evidence for such a pattern. The TTO scores for state 
32211 [32313] were corrected with the discounting results using both state 21111 
[22222] and state 33333. The questions were posed in terms of years and months. 
Subjects ranked seven different health profiles in the intertemporal ranking 
task. Each profile consisted of the same two health states: full health and an impaired 
EQ-5D health state. The latter was state 21111 for Sample A and 22222 for Sample B. 
Table I shows the included health profiles for the two samples. 
 
<TABLE I HERE> 
 
3.4. Analysis 
 
3.4.1. Visual analogue scale 
 
A number of subjects did not place death on the lower end of the scale, and, hence, 
indicated they did not consider immediate death to be the worst imaginable health 
state. Therefore, we normalized the VAS scores: 
 
D
DVASVASN
−
−
=
100
 (8) 
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Consequently, VASN was on a similar scale as SG and TTO [U(D)=0 and U(FH)=1], 
facilitating comparisons between the methods. 
 
3.4.2. Discounting 
 
The TTO scores were adjusted for the DM discounting estimates by means of the 
procedure described by Attema and Brouwer (2009). The adjustment for the DOI 
measure was performed by estimating a discounting parameter under the assumption 
of exponential discounting and solving the resulting equation representing the TTO 
indifference. This procedure has been described by Johannesson et al. (1994) and van 
der Pol and Roux (2005). 
 
3.4.3. Intertemporal ranking task 
 
We computed the number of QALYs of the health profiles in the intertemporal 
ranking exercise by applying the estimated values of health state 21111 [22222] in 
version A [B] and the linear QALY model to the profiles for each valuation task. For 
example, the number of QALYs of profile 5 in Table I, using the data for TTO, is 
equal to5.5 4 (21111)UTTOv+ , where the subscript UTTO indicates the unadjusted 
estimate obtained by means of the TTO method. This exercise was repeated for 
discounted QALYs, using the discounting estimates obtained with the DOI method 
and the DM, respectively. 
We performed three tests also used by Bleichrodt and Johannesson (1997), i.e., 
we compared consistency with direct ranking using the mean Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients and two social choice rules: the method of majority voting and 
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the Borda rule. These three tests generated similar results, and, hence, we only report 
the results of the Spearman tests. The Spearman coefficients were compared using 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests. We also performed t-tests which, yielding similar 
results, are not reported. 
 
4. Results 
 
Table II shows summary statistics of the subjects.  
 
<TABLE II HERE> 
 
In Sample A [B], 25 [15] subjects chose a dominated option at least once in the TTO 
task. We excluded these subjects from the analysis. We did the same in the case of the 
SG task, which resulted in the exclusion of 11 [11] additional subjects. Furthermore, 
we removed subjects who did not value FH as the best possible health state in the 
VAS. This resulted in the exclusion of 39 [40] additional subjects, leaving 187 [192] 
subjects for the analysis. 
Tables IIIa presents the median and mean health utility estimates and 
compares them with the TTO scores elicited by Lamers et al. (2006). Table IIIb does 
the same, while excluding subjects who chose the same option for all questions of at 
least one of the two DM tasks (A: 75; B: 74). Although it may be possible that such a 
choice pattern reflects a subject’s true preferences, this is highly unlikely, since it 
would for example imply the subject would prefer never being in perfect health to 
being in perfect health for at least some months (and being in the same health state for 
the remaining time). Furthermore, Table IIIb excludes 30 [35] more subjects violating 
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dominance in the ranking task at least one time. We performed the analyses both with 
and without subjects violating dominance in the ranking task. 
 
<TABLES IIIA AND IIIB HERE> 
 
These results show that the TTO scores produced here are fairly comparable to 
those in the Dutch national tariffs (especially in Table IIIa). Moreover, the TTO 
scores are fairly similar to the SG scores (but still significantly different for states 
21111, 22222, and 3333; Wilcoxon signed ranks test, p<0.05). The normalized VAS 
scores, on the other hand, are substantially lower for milder states (p<0.06), and 
higher for the most severe state (p<0.01). This may be the result of endpoint bias. The 
finding of a positive median VAS value for state 33333 is in accordance with previous 
studies, which suggest that people tend to take the outcome ‘death’ to be a natural 
lower end on a rating scale (Gudex et al., 1996; Robinson et al., 1997); whereas, this 
kind of behavior is much less obvious for SG and TTO. Moreover, the VAS produced 
significantly fewer WTD states than the other methods (p<0.01, see Table IV).  
 
<TABLE IV HERE> 
 
 Tables Va and Vb shows the median corrected TTO scores and the implied 
CFs6. All TTO scores corrected by means of the DM are significantly higher than the 
                                               
6
 Two CFs are reported for states 32211 and 32313, because we computed a CF using the estimates of 
both discounting tasks (i.e., discounting elicited both with 21111 and 33333 for 32211, and discounting 
elicited both with 22222 and 33333 for 32313) for these states (as they are somewhere in-between). 
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uncorrected ones (p<0.03). When corrected with the DOI method, however, no 
significant differences result.7 
 
<TABLES Va AND Vb HERE> 
 
The CFs make clear that correcting for discounting may have a strong effect 
on TTO scores, and that this effect increases with the health state’s severity. Indeed, 
the CF is particularly high for the WTD state 33333. This can be partly explained by 
the higher range for WTD values (minimum -29, so range of 29) as compared to BTD 
values (0–1), allowing for a higher correction potential for WTD states. We regressed 
the CFs on several other background characteristics, but none of them turned out to be 
significantly related to CF. 
 The CFs estimated by means of the DOI method are considerably lower than 
those estimated by means of the DM. This finding is in agreement with earlier studies 
employing the DOI method (Dolan and Gudex, 1995, van der Pol and Roux, 2005). 
These tend to find a discount rate around 0, as we do for the DOI method. 
 
4.1. Intertemporal ranking task 
 
Table VI shows the results of the intertemporal ranking analysis for Sample A. They 
provide mixed evidence regarding the effect of correcting for discounting upon the 
ability to explain ranking of health profiles. Some correlations are quite low, raising 
the question whether the intertemporal ranking task is able to provide a sound 
criterion against which to evaluate the validity of the different methods to generate 
                                               
7
 Note that in Sample A [B], 5 [1] more subjects were excluded from the analysis for the DOI method, 
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accurate utilities. In Sample A, the VAS scores clearly predict the rankings best 
(p<0.01). This would indicate that our TTO and SG elicitations are too high. The 
same holds for the median score of Lamers et al. (2006). Furthermore, correcting for 
discounting does not increase predicted ranking here: instead, it decreases correlation 
with direct ranking even further, although the difference is not significant (p=0.198) 
in the sample including ranking violators and significant at the 5% level only when 
excluding them (p=0.04). Given that the uncorrected TTO scores were already too 
high, according to the ranking standard at least, this could be expected. One 
explanation would be that loss aversion causes an upward bias in the TTO and SG 
biases. If, for the moment, we assume the intertemporal ranking task is a good 
benchmark, our results suggest that the magnitude of this bias is higher than the 
magnitude of the bias caused by discounting. Hence, correcting for discounting 
removes a countervailing force against the upward tendency of loss aversion, 
changing TTO scores that are too high into TTO scores that are even higher. 
 
<TABLE VI HERE> 
 
The results for Sample B are quite different (Table VII). The VAS is now 
predicting the rankings the worst (p<0.01), whereas the TTO estimates perform best 
(although the difference with SG is not significant, p>0.12). The VAS scores 
therefore seem to be too low in this sample. Correcting for discounting causes no 
significant change in the accuracy of the prediction generated by the TTO scores.  
 
<TABLE VII HERE> 
                                                                                                                                       
because these gave an answer of 0, implying a discount rate of minus infinity. 
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5. Discussion 
 
Given the clear and potentially large influence discounting may have on health state 
utilities derived with the TTO method, we set out to find a set of correction factors 
with which commonly used national tariffs could be corrected. Our results suggest 
that correcting TTO scores for discounting indeed can have a substantial impact, 
especially for severe (worse than dead) health states. This holds even though, overall, 
in our sample the discount rates for future health turned out to be relatively low. Our 
results, moreover, indicate that the choice for a particular elicitation method for 
discount rates needs to be well justified, since they produce different estimates 
regarding discount rates.  The results presented in this paper therefore can only serve 
as a first indication of potential correction factors for TTO tariffs.  
Given the different biases present in TTO scores, which work in opposite 
directions, an important question was whether correcting TTO scores for discounting 
provide a better indication of health state utilities. This question is not easily 
answered. We used an intertemporal ranking task to study this. The results from this 
task provided rather mixed evidence regarding the potential of the correction of TTO 
scores for discounting to increase TTO’s predictive ability. Broadly speaking, 
corrected TTO scores performed, at best, not worse than uncorrected scores. Whether 
this is due to the other biases present in TTO or whether such the ranking task may 
not be fully capable of properly testing face validity of a particular elicitation method, 
remains to be further investigated. Also given the differences in results between our 
two subsamples in this respect, we propose that the validity of the intertemporal 
ranking task used for this purpose needs to be better established. Therefore, more 
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research into developing criteria against which one can compare different estimates is 
definitely worthwhile. 
 Our research has several limitations. First, the relatively high amount of 
dominated and random choices warrants caution. It may highlight the drawbacks of 
internet surveys, since it is hard to enforce effort among subjects and to ascertain their 
motivation. Moreover, lay people may have difficulty with the measurement tasks, 
which are cognitively quite demanding. Discounting elicitation tasks, in particular, 
seem to be hard to answer for many subjects. This suggests there is a tradeoff between 
predictive accuracy on the one hand, and cognitive limitations on the other (Dave et 
al., 2010). 
Finding a convenient method to accurately measure discounting of future 
health outcomes has been an issue for many years, and still is. The DOI method is 
already quite challenging, needs particular parametric assumptions, and generally 
elicits discounting estimates close to zero. The latter does not seem to be in line with 
discounting estimates in other domains. The DM, on the other hand, does not need 
parametric assumptions, but also seems to be burdensome for general public samples. 
As such, it generates (very) low discounting estimates as well, contrary to applications 
of the DM in student samples, where much higher discount rates were reported 
(Attema and Brouwer, 2012a; Attema et al., forthcoming b). Hence, we recommend 
the development of a toolkit to elicit discounting of future health outcomes that is 
easier to grasp for the general population. At the same time, methods capable of 
investigating the validity of estimated discount rates are warranted, given the 
differences between the elicitation methods. Guidance regarding which method 
produces ‘better’ estimates seems required. 
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Concluding, we have reported a study deriving correction factors applicable to 
national tariffs for health state valuations based on the popular TTO method. While it 
seems pivotal to correct TTO scores for the (several) biases currently distorting them, 
it is unclear at present which methods are best suited to do so and whether correcting 
TTO scores for only one bias (discounting), but not for others, results in more 
accurate health state valuations. Moreover, it seems that sound ways of testing 
whether corrected scores perform ‘better’ than uncorrected scores are currently 
lacking. It seems therefore, that much research in this important area is required.    
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TABLES 
 
 
Table I. Stimuli intertemporal ranking task 
Sample A 
Profile 1) 10 years in 21111, then die 
Profile 2) 9.5 years in 11111, then die 
Profile 3) 9 years in 11111, then die 
Profile 4) 8.5 years in 11111, then 1 year in 21111, then die 
Profile 5) 5.5 years in 11111, then 4 years in 21111, then die 
Profile 6) 3.5 years in 11111, then 6 years in 21111, then die 
Profile 7) 3 years in 11111, then 7 years in 21111, then die 
 
Sample B 
Profile 1) 10 years in 22222, then die 
Profile 2) 6.5 years in 11111, then die 
Profile 3) 6 years in 11111, then die 
Profile 4) 5.5 years in 11111, then 1 year in 22222, then die 
Profile 5) 4 years in 11111, then 4 years in 22222, then die 
Profile 6) 2.5 years in 11111, then 6 years in 22222, then die 
Profile 7) 2 years in 11111, then 7 years in 22222, then die 
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Table II. Summary statistics 
 
SAMPLE A (N=262) 
Variable Percentage Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Age  41.5 12.88 18 65 
Gender (% male) 47.7     
Children (%yes) 56.9     
Number of children 
(among people with 
children, n=149) 
 2.15  1 9 
Income groups:      
<€1000 11.1     
€1000-<€2000 37.0     
€2000-<€3000 30.2     
€3000-<€4000 14.9     
>€3999 6.9     
Education:      
Lower 24.0     
Middle 42.4     
Higher 33.6     
Health status      
EQ-5D (Dutch 
tariff) 
 0.88 0.18 0.009 1 
VAS  77.46 16.46 4 100 
Completion time (mins.)  19.1 12.0 6.1 91.1 
 
SAMPLE B (N=258) 
Variable Percentage Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Age  42.1 12.13 18 65 
Gender (% male) 46.9     
Children (%yes) 63.6     
Number of children 
(among people with 
children, n=164) 
 2.09  1 8 
Income groups:      
<€1000 5.8     
€1000-<€2000 33.7     
€2000-<€3000 37.2     
€3000-<€4000 15.9     
>€3999 7.4     
Education:      
Lower 20.5     
Middle 45.7     
Higher 33.7     
Health status      
EQ-5D (Dutch 
tariff) 
 0.86 0.22 0.09 1 
VAS  76.33 17.39 10 100 
Completion time (mins.)  22.3 10.5 5.2 78.9 
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Table IIIa. Median (mean) health state utilities (excluding subjects with dominated 
choices) 
EQ-5D Health state VASN SG TTO TTO Lamers 
et al. (2006) 
SAMPLE 
21111  0.78 (0.68) 0.91 (0.75) 0.97 (0.84) 0.99 (0.91) A (n=187) 
22222  0.44 (0.16) 0.59 (-0.37) 0.72 (0.17) 0.68 (0.54) B (n=192) 
32211  0.39 (0.28) 0.59 (-0.68) 0.60 (-0.22) 0.55 (0.42) A (n=187) 
32313 0.23 (-0.05) 0.03 (-1.81) 0.03 (-2.19) 0.03 (0.04) B (n=192) 
33333 0.09 (-0.25) -0.28 (2.96) -0.67 (-4.17) -0.38 (-0.30) A+B (n=379) 
 
 
Table IIIb. Median (mean) health state utilities (excluding subjects with dominated 
choices, subjects excluded from discounting task [either for mild one or for severe one] and 
subjects violating ranking) 
EQ-5D Health state VASN SG TTO TTO Lamers 
et al. (2006) 
SAMPLE 
21111 0.78 (0.72) 0.91 (0.80) 0.93 (0.87) 0.99 (0.91) A (n=82) 
22222 0.44 (0.27) 0.65 (0.16) 0.72 (0.20) 0.68 (0.54) B (n=83) 
32211 0.42 (0.30) 0.59 (0.38) 0.47 (0.06) 0.55 (0.42) A (n=82) 
32313 0.21 (-0.03) -0.03 (-0.98) -0.03 (-2.19) 0.03 (0.04) B (n=83) 
33333 0.08 (-0.15) -0.28 (-1.86) -0.67 (-3.87) -0.38 (-0.30) A+B (n=165) 
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Table IV. Percentage WTD responses 
 
EQ-5D 
Health state 
VASN SG TTO TTO 
Lamers et 
al. (2006) 
SAMPLE 
21111 3.7 3.7 2.1 1 A (n=187) 
22222 10.4 11.5 9.9 12 B (n=192) 
32211 8.0 14.4 15.0 16 A (n=187) 
32313 17.2 45.8 49.0 39 B (n=192) 
33333 20.6 71.0 72.3 62 A+B (n=379) 
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Table Va. Median corrected TTO scores and implied CFs 
EQ-5D 
Health state 
CTTO DM CF DM CTTO DOI* CF DOI SAMPLE 
21111 0.963 -0.003 0.94 (n=107) -0.03 A (n=112) 
22222 0.780 0.06 0.72 (n=117) 0 B (n=118) 
32211 
0.610 
(21111) 
0.654 
(33333) 
0.11 
(21111) 
0.154 
(33333) 
0.52 (n=107) 0.05 A (n=112) 
32313 
-0.03 
(22222) 
-0.02 
(33333) 
0 (22222) 
0.01 (33333) 
-0.03 
(n=117) 0 B (n=118) 
33333 -0.32 0.35 -0.54 (n=224) 0.06 
A+B 
(n=230) 
 
Table Vb. Median corrected TTO scores and implied CFs without ranking violators 
EQ-5D Health 
state 
CTTO DM CF DM CTTO DOI CF DOI SAMPLE 
21111 0.97 0.04 0.92 n=78 0.02 A (n=82) 
22222 0.78 0.06 0.72 n=82 0 B (n=83) 
32211 0.61 (21111) 0.63 (33333) 
0.14 (21111) 
0.16 (33333) 0.51 n=78 0.04 A (n=82) 
32313 -0.02 (22222 
and 33333) 
0.01 
(22222 and 
33333) 
-0.03 n=82 0 B (n=83) 
33333 -0.40 0.27 -0.67 n=160 0 A+B (n=165) 
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Table VI. Spearman rank correlations coefficients of tasks with direct rankings (Sample 
A) 
 
Method Median (Mean) 
[n=112] 
Excluding ranking violators 
[n=82] 
Corrected mean TTO Lamers 0.21 (0.19) 0.18 (0.16) 
Corrected TTO (DM) 0.19 (0.17) 0.21 (0.18) 
Corrected TTO (profile discounted DM) 0.22 (0.18) 0.29 (0.22) 
Corrected TTO (DOI) 0.29 (0.20) n=107 0.32 (0.24) n=78 
Corrected TTO (profile discounted DOI) 0.32 (0.21) n=107 0.38 (0.24) n=78 
Mean TTO Lamers 0.39 (0.38) 0.39 (0.40) 
SG 0.39 (0.35) 0.39 (0.34) 
SG (profile discounted DM) 0.36 (0.31) 0.39 (0.35) 
SG (profile discounted DOI) 0.43 (0.35) n=107 0.43 (0.33) n=78 
TTO 0.30 (0.21) 0.38 (0.25) 
TTO (profile discounted DM) 0.29 (0.23) 0.34 (0.30) 
TTO (profile discounted DOI) 0.29 (0.21) n=107 0.29 (0.23) n=78 
VAS 0.71 (0.65) 0.79 (0.68) 
VAS (profile discounted DM) 0.73 (0.59) 0.79 (0.66) 
VAS (profile discounted DOI) 0.71 (0.65) n=107 0.75 (0.67) n=78 
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Table VII. Spearman rank correlations coefficients of tasks with direct rankings 
(Sample B) 
 
Method  Median (Mean) 
[n=118] 
Excluding ranking violators 
[n=83] 
Corrected TTO (DM) 0.47 (0.32) 0.68 (0.36) 
Corrected TTO (profile discounted DM) 0.5 (0.31) 0.5 (0.34) 
Corrected median TTO Lamers (DM) -0.14 (-0.12) -0.11 (-0.07) 
Corrected TTO (DOI) 0.43 (0.31) n=117 0.61 (0.36) n=82 
Corrected TTO (profile discounted DOI) 0.5 (0.31) n=117 0.51 (0.34) n=82 
Median TTO Lamers 0.48 (0.27) 0.39 (0.24) 
SG 0.36 (0.24) 0.46 (0.30) 
SG (profile discounted DM) 0.32 (0.23) 0.5 (0.29) 
SG (profile discounted DOI) 0.36 (0.24) n=117 0.46 (0.29) n=82 
TTO 0.59 (0.34) 0.68 (0.38) 
TTO (profile discounted DM) 0.46 (0.27) 0.5 (0.33) 
TTO (profile discounted DOI) 0.54 (0.31) n=117 0.54 (0.33) n=82 
VAS 0.04 (0.00) 0.07 (0.03) 
VAS (profile discounted DM) 0.05 (0.01) 0.07 (0.05) 
VAS (profile discounted DOI) 0.11 (0.05) n=117 0.16 (0.07) n=82 
 
 
